


Provably Efficient Generalized Lagrangian Policy Optimization for Safe MARL

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
MOTIVATION

Multi-agent sequential decision making




Trade-off { reward, profit, ... } vs. { safety, budget, fairness, ... }

Constraint-rich multi-agent systems



automated vehicles




satellite communication

Challenges


- safe exploration
- efficiency

PROBLEM FORMULATION

Episodic learning protocol



- $\ell = 0, \dots, L - \text{horizon}$
- $(x_\ell^t, y_\ell^t), (a_\ell^t, b_\ell^t), r_\ell^t, (g_\ell^t, h_\ell^t)$ – state, action, **reward**, utilities
- $a_\ell^t \sim \pi^t(\cdot | x_\ell^t), b_\ell^t \sim \mu^t(\cdot | y_\ell^t)$ – policies
- $x_{\ell+1}^t \sim P_1(\cdot | x_\ell^t, a_\ell^t), y_{\ell+1}^t \sim P_2(\cdot | y_\ell^t, b_\ell^t)$ – independent dynamics



- $\langle q_1^t \cdot q_2^t, r^t \rangle := \mathbb{E}[\sum_{\ell=0}^{L-1} r^t(x_\ell, a_\ell, a_\ell, b_\ell)]$ – reward value
- $\langle q_1^t, g^t \rangle := \mathbb{E}[\sum_{\ell=0}^{L-1} g^t(x_\ell, a_\ell)]$ – utility value; also for $\langle q_2^t, h^t \rangle$

Constrained zero-sum Markov game

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{q_1 \in \Delta(P_1)}{\text{maximize}} \quad \underset{q_2 \in \Delta(P_2)}{\text{minimize}} \quad \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \langle q_1 \cdot q_2, r^t \rangle \\ & \text{subject to} \quad \langle q_1, g \rangle + \langle q_2, h \rangle \leq b \end{aligned}$$

- r^t – adversarial
- g, h – expectations of stochastic g^t, h^t
- (q_1^*, q_2^*) – constrained Nash equilibrium

PERFORMANCE MEASURE

$$\text{Regret}(K) := \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} (\langle q_1^t \cdot q_2^*, r^t \rangle - \langle q_1^* \cdot q_2^t, r^t \rangle)$$

$$\text{Violation}(K) := \sum_{k=1}^K (\langle q_1^k, g^k \rangle + \langle q_2^k, h^k \rangle - b)$$

- q_1^t / q_2^t – occupancy measures induced by policies π^t / μ^t

ALGORITHM DESIGN

One-episode constrained minimax problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{q_1 \in \Delta(P_1)}{\text{maximize}} \quad \underset{q_2 \in \Delta(P_2)}{\text{minimize}} \quad \langle q_1 \cdot q_2, r^{t-1} \rangle \\ & \text{subject to} \quad \langle q_1, g^{t-1} \rangle + \langle q_2, h^{t-1} \rangle \leq b \end{aligned}$$

- $L^t(q_1, q_2; \lambda)$ – generalized Lagrangian
- $= \langle q_1 \cdot q_2, r^{t-1} \rangle$ minimax obj.
- $+ \lambda (\langle q_1, g^{t-1} \rangle + \langle q_2, h^{t-1} \rangle - b)$ min's vio.
- $- \lambda (\langle q_1, g^{t-1} \rangle + \langle q_2, h^{t-1} \rangle - b)$ max's vio.

Online mirror descent primal-dual step


$$\hat{q}^t = \arg \min_{q_1 \in \hat{\Delta}_1} \arg \max_{q_2 \in \hat{\Delta}_2} L^t(q_1, q_2, \lambda^{t-1}) + \frac{1}{\eta} D_{\text{KL}}(q, \hat{q}^{t-1})$$

$$\lambda^t = \max \left(\lambda^{k-1} + \underbrace{(\langle \hat{q}_1^t, g^{t-1} \rangle + \langle \hat{q}_2^t, h^{t-1} \rangle - b)}, 0 \right)$$

- compete for rewards
- cooperate for constraints

Optimistic estimation of $\hat{\Delta}_1, \hat{\Delta}_2$

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{P}_1 &\leftarrow \bar{P}_1 + \text{UCB}_1 \\ \hat{P}_2 &\leftarrow \bar{P}_2 + \text{UCB}_2 \end{aligned}$$



$$\hat{\Delta}_i = \text{Linear constraint } (\bar{P}_i, \text{UCB}_i)$$

THEORETICAL GUARANTEE

Constrained Markov games with independent dynamics

$$\text{Regret}(K), \text{Violation}(K) = \tilde{O}((|X| + |Y|) L \sqrt{T(|A| + |B|)})$$

- T – # episodes;
- L – horizon length
- $|X| + |Y|, |A| + |B|$ – state/action space sizes
- no sampling assumptions & adversarial reward function
- applicable to side constraint case and single-controller case

REFERENCE

- [1] D. Ding, X. Wei, Z. Yang, Z. Wang, M. Jovanovic, "Provably Efficient Generalized Lagrangian Policy Optimization for Safe Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning", arXiv:2306.00212 (a long version with appendices).